Abstract: How does factor accumulation affect an open economy's pattern of international specialization and returns to capital? We provide a new integrated treatment to this question using a panel of 44 developing and developed countries over the period 1976-2000. The data confirm the Heckscher-Ohlin prediction that, with sufficient differences in country endowments, there is no factor price equalization and countries specialize in different subsets of goods. Innovatively, we obtain the returns to capital implied by this model: these are consistent with the Lucas paradox, which we explain after accounting for cross-country differences in the cost of capital goods. Our findings are also consistent with Ventura's hypothesis that the growth of small open economies can be promoted by "beating the curse of diminishing returns" -indeed we find no decrease in the return to capital at any given capital-labor ratio despite capital accumulation by most countries within a cone of diversification.
Introduction
The Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model predicts that international specialization and trade are driven by differences in factor endowments. It is one of the most influential models in international economics because it has far-reaching implications for the level and distribution of income. For instance, the model predicts that, in rich countries, a growing trade with developing nations will increase the total income, while redistributing income towards skilled workers and the owners of capital.
Another prediction of the HO model is that, if country endowments in effective factors are very different, there will be no factor price equalization (FPE), with a higher rental cost of capital in poor countries. This should lead to flows of capital to the less developed countries and to higher wages in these countries -a prediction that is at the origin of the Lucas (1990) paradox.
This paper examines empirically some of the implications of the HO model for international productive specialization, factor returns and economic growth -it does not however directly investigate trade flows and relative factor asymmetries across countries. To this end, we proceed in two steps. We first show that the factor proportions model without FPE provides a good description of what happened to 44 developing and developed countries in terms of productive patterns of specialization over the period . In a second step, most innovatively relative to the existing literature, we study the implications of the model we estimated for factor returns and growth. For this purpose, we obtain direct estimates of workers' compensation and returns to capital (or the value of the marginal product of capital, MPK) in each country.
1 With these estimates, we check the internal consistency of our approach and confirm that there is indeed no overall FPE, with higher implied wages in rich countries and higher implied returns to capital in the less developed countries. We proceed in our analysis by examining how the returns to capital generated by our empirical model can be used to discuss the Lucas (1990) capital flows paradox and Ventura's (1997) analysis of the East Asian growth miracles.
In this paper, the estimation of the HO model is based on the graphical approach by Deardorff (1974) , which is also adopted by Leamer (1984) and Schott (2003) . 2 This approach is particularly convenient for our purpose. First, it allows countries to specialize in a subset of goods. In the HO model, this is a necessary result when factor endowments are very different across countries: with highly heterogeneous endowments, there is no FPE and countries must specialize in the subset of goods most suited to their endowments. While most previous studies in trade assumed that factor prices are equalized, more recent research provides evidence that there is no overall FPE and that OECD and poorer countries belong stocks of capital using the results of Eaton and Kortum (2001) , who use data on the international trade of equipment goods to infer the price of quality-equivalent capital in various countries.
As in the standard HO model with multiple cones, and despite TFP differences across countries, we find that the returns to capital tend to be higher in poor countries. So how can we explain the Lucas (1990) paradox? In other words, why is it the case that we observe no systematic flow of capital from rich to poor countries in presence of this apparent arbitrage opportunity? Our explanation is the following: once we take into account the fact that the cost of capital adjusted for quality differences is much higher in these countries, as found by Eaton and Kortum (2001) , the rate-of-return differential vanishes. Indeed, the financial rate of return to capital investment is not higher in poor countries. For an investor, not much is to be gained from a systematic reallocation of capital from rich to poor countries. We therefore confirm the empirical finding of Caselli and Feyrer (2007) although we follow a totally different approach: the value of the MPK is higher in poor countries, but the financial rates of return of investing in manufacturing are much more similar across countries, and the reason for this is the higher relative price of capital goods in poor countries.
The returns to capital implied by our analysis have remained stable over time at fixed effective capital-labor ratios, despite capital accumulation by most countries worldwide. This should have acted as a growth enhancing factor: even though most countries accumulated capital over the time period in our sample and increased the world supply of capital-intensive goods (a predictable Rybczynski effect), the return on capital has kept relatively stable at fixed capital intensity thus sustaining incentives to keep investing in capital and producing capitalintensive goods. This MPK stability can be understood in the context of the HO model we estimated, where MPK is constant within the diversification cone, to which East Asian economies belong in their first stage of "miracle growth." Since these economies were relatively small, their capital deepening and increased specialization in capital-intensive goods did not affect the worldwide price of capitalintensive goods or the price of capital. 5 This means that the "miracle" economies in East Asia could enjoy economic growth without decreasing returns while growing within the cone of diversification as predicted by Ventura (1997) . Further to this result, our analysis points to increasing specialization of most countries in capital-intensive industries to be facilitated by the stability of returns to capital at all capital-labor ratios as obtained from our empirical analysis.
The most related papers to our work in the literature are probably Davis and Weinstein (2001) , Debaere and Demiroglu (2003) and Schott (2003) . Relative to Davis and Weinstein (2001) and Debaere and Demiroglu (2003) , we adopt a common approach towards modifying the original HO model in terms of productivity adjustments, although we innovate by using a panel dataset with a time dimension that allows us to explore the model's implications for factor returns and specialization patterns over time, while also examining both developed and developing countries (and not only OECD countries as in their original contributions). Schott (2003) presents evidence of multiple cones of diversification for a cross-section of 45 developed and developing countries in 1990. Relative to Schott (2003) , we follow his approach to tackle intra-industry heterogeneity by constructing "HO aggregates" of industries that use similar capital-intensities in production, and we estimate the HO model with multiple cones based on Deardorff's (1974) graphical analysis. However, our work includes the treatment of cross-country technological differences and factor quality, in addition to our use of panel data that enables us to use the time dimension to explore the model's implications for factor returns and specialization patterns over time.
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In a related work, Xu (2003) runs Rybczynski regressions at the industry level on a panel of 14 developing countries during the period 1982-1992. As in our work, he also presents evidence that these developing countries belonged to different cones during the period under consideration. But he finds that developing countries tend to specialize in labor-intensive goods when they accumulate capital, a contradiction to the Rybczynski prediction and to our results. The difference in results may be due to the fact that Xu (2003) defines the capital-intensity of an industry as the average industry capital-intensity during the whole period and across all countries, while we define HO aggregates that include industries with similar levels of capital intensity by looking at each industry in each country in each year in our sample. This aggregation procedure explicitly takes into account the fact that there are substantial differences in capital intensity within industries and that countries alter their intra-industry specialization as they accumulate capital. What we present in this paper is therefore a test of the HO model that is both less restrictive and more in the spirit of the original model.
Finally, we share a common focus on FPE (or its breakdown) and specialization in production with Hanson and Slaughter (2002) , Bernard et al. (2013) , 6 Schott's (2003) estimation procedure is more complete than ours in the sense that it includes the estimation of optimal HO aggregation and cones cutoffs. Because of the added time dimension, we choose to use the empirical results of Debaere and Demiroglu (2003) and Schott (2003) to inform our choice of these parameters, thereby simplifying the estimation procedures. Chiquiar (2008) , but those papers focus on a single country (Mexico, US and UK), whereas we use panel data for 44 developed and developing countries.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 estimates the production side of the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin model. Section 3 focuses on the returns to capital implied by our model and exposes discusses the implications of our results in terms of growth. The last section concludes.
The production side of the Heckscher-Ohlin model
Our theoretical framework is the traditional 2 × 2 Heckscher-Ohlin model. We shall explain in this section how we make it empirically operational. We will also give arguments for selecting this particular model.
Deardorff's (1974) graphical approach to specialization
Consider N countries, n = 1,…,N. At date t, country n is endowed with a quantity t n K of capital and a quantity t n L of labor. There are two goods that can be produced in each country: good l is labor-intensive, and good k is capital-intensive. There is no factor intensity reversal. Factors are mobile between sectors, but immobile internationally. Both goods are produced with constant returns to scale (CRS) by competitive firms, and the marginal product of each factor is positive and decreasing at the firm (and industry) level. For the moment, we assume that all countries have access to the same technology. Each country is small and can freely trade goods on the world market at date-t prices.
In a competitive equilibrium, when factor endowments are sufficiently different, countries cannot lie in the FPE set. As factor prices are not equalized, countries have to specialize according to their endowments: they are located in different cones of specialization. The countries with a low capital-labor ratio
specialize in the production of the labor-intensive good. ( / ] ; ) ) t t t n n K L τ τ ∈ =+∞ specialize in the production of the capital-intensive good. In this setting, 1 t τ and 2 t τ are the two possibly time-varying boundaries of the cone of diversification.
More precisely, the countries with a low capital endowment produce only the labor-intensive good with an output per worker given by:
where n denotes a country (or "nation"), and t a date. F l (.) denotes the production function for the labor-intensive good, and f l (k)≡F l (k, 1) is the production function in intensive form and is concave. Note that in the previous equation but also in the following ones, t n L denotes the total quantity of labor employed in the manufacturing sector of country n at date t.
For the countries in the cone of diversification, the output per worker for good a is given by:
with 0, 0, 0, 0,
The countries with a high capital endowment specialize in the production of the capital-intensive good:
( , ) / ,
where F k (.) denotes the production function for the capital-intensive good, and f k (.) is concave. Following Deardorff (1974 Deardorff ( , 2000 , Figure 1 represents the theoretically implied patterns of specialization. The dashed line represents the value added of the labor-intensive good divided by the total number of workers in manufacturing over a country's "development path." Similarly, the solid line represents value
Production path of the labor-intensive good Production path of the capital-intensive good added per worker for the capital-intensive good. The Rybczynski effect says that, with fixed prices and technologies, capital accumulation in the cone of diversification leads to a reduced production of the labor-intensive good and to an increased production of the capital-intensive good. That is exactly what can be observed in Figure 1 : initially only an increasing quantity of labor-intensive good is produced, but once the economy reaches the capital-labor ratio necessary to enter the cone of diversification, this production starts falling until it reaches zero in the final cone of specialization in the production of the capital-intensive good; the capital-intensive good displays the opposite behavior over this economy's development path as it keeps growing from zero as soon as the economy reached the cone of diversification. The thin straight line that is tangent to the two curves determines the capital-labor ratios in the two industries (equal to 1 t τ and 2 , t τ respectively).
One can simply compute total value added per worker for the various levels of capital per worker by adding up total value added per worker of the laborintensive good and total value added per worker of the capital-intensive good for each level of capital per worker. It can be shown that the slope of this total value added per worker curve is equal to the rental cost of capital, and that the intercept of the tangent to this curve with the vertical axis is the compensation per worker. This graphical analysis will be of use to compute factor returns later in this paper.
As is also well-known and can be thought of as a result of the Stolper-Samuelson and of the Rybczynski Theorems, a change in the relative price of the two goods or biased technological progress should modify the structure of industrial production. For instance, if the relative price of the capital-intensive good goes up or if technological progress is biased in its direction, then the two cone cutoffs should move to the left, with more countries producing the capital-intensive goods and each country in the cone of diversification producing relatively more of the capital-intensive goods. This is an important result that will be considered when we undertake the model's empirical estimation later in the paper.
A useful property of the model is that we can estimate it with no particular assumption about demand. For instance, we do not have to make the "consumption similarity" assumption that is used more or less explicitly in the works on the factor content of trade.
7 Demand factors are still important, but only through their effects on prices.
We must however recognize that our choice to use the traditional HeckscherOhlin-Samuelson (HOS) model is not exempt of disadvantages relative to other HO model versions, such as the Heckscher-Ohlin-Vanek (HOV). Indeed, we are unable to examine actual richer patterns of specialization than the implied by the simplifying assumption of only two goods in the economy -and an analysis of the existing industry heterogeneity would be particularly interesting to examine in a dynamic setting as allowed by our panel dataset. 
Empirical approach
We focus on the manufacturing sector as it should contain fewer non-tradables than other sectors of the economy, such as the agricultural or the service sectors. This choice makes it more reasonable the assumption that, whatever their location, all firms producing similar goods can sell these goods at the same price. Naturally, including the agricultural and service sectors could provide a stricter test of the model at stake.
A continuum of goods We now give some empirical content to the HO model we want to estimate. In reality, much more than two goods are produced. Suppose that there are actually three cones (one of diversification, two of specialization), with rental costs of capital varying across cones but constant within the cone of diversification.
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Theory implies that a country with a capital-labor ratio K n /L n just above τ i will only produce goods with a capital-labor ratio at K/L = τ i or just above, a prediction rejected by the data. We rather rely on a specification that yields desirable theoretical properties and seems empirically appropriate, as shown later. In the spirit of Dornbusch, Fischer, and Samuelson (1980) , we assume that each country produces a continuum of goods with various capital-labor intensities. Country n is populated by a continuum of workers with a total mass L n . This country is also endowed with K n units of capital. Omitting the time superscript, let τ 1 and τ 2 be the two cone cutoffs. Each worker is indexed by i, with i uniformly distributed on the interval [0;1]. We suppose that worker i works in a production facility with a capital-labor ratio
This implies that country n produces goods with
This also implies that country n's capital-labor ratio is K n /L n as required. With these assumptions, a country with a capital-labor ratio equal to τ 1 produces goods such that
while a country with a capitallabor ratio equal to τ 2 produces goods such that 2 1 2 2
There is therefore a cutoff
such that countries in the labor-rich cone produce only goods with a capital-labor ratio below q, and countries in the capital-rich cone produce only goods with a capital-labor ratio above q.
The Heckscher-Ohlin aggregates Given the above specification and the good cutoff, we can follow Schott (2003) and define "Heckscher-Ohlin aggregates."
The labor-intensive HO aggregate is the set of goods such that ( ) , K i q L ≤ while the capital-intensive aggregate is the set of goods such that ( ) . K i q L > As we do not have data on specific goods but only on International Standard Industrial Classification (ISIC) industries, we shall measure the total value-added of the laborintensive aggregate produced by country n at time t as:
,
while the total value-added of the capital-intensive for aggregate country n at time t is equal to:
.
We thus aggregate industries according to their capital-intensity rather than according to their end use (as most classifications such as the ISIC do), as in the HO model. A number of examples may illustrate the importance of this method: for instance, in Schott's (2003) preferred model, the footwear industry in Panama is classified as belonging to a labor-intensive aggregate, while the Italian footwear industry belongs to an aggregate with a higher capital intensity. For any ISIC industry, cross-country differences in factor intensity might reflect, beyond factor substitution, the fact that countries specialize in goods that differ in quality. It might also be the result of an international fragmentation of the production process, with the labor-rich countries specializing in the production stages that are labor-demanding. The aggregation has important consequences. Most importantly, goods are defined according to their capital intensity as in the production side of the HO model. In addition, this strategy allows us to reduce the number of "goods."
We take the results by Debaere and Demiroglu (2003) and Schott (2003) as evidence that countries lie in different cones. Specifically, we assume that each country at a certain time period belongs to one of three cones. Also by assumption, the marginal product of capital is constant within each of the first two cones, but decreasing in the third one, just as in the textbook 2 × 2 model. 10 The presence of diminishing returns to capital accumulation in the capital-rich cone may be interpreted as evidence that factors of production of an immaterial nature (for example, organizational capital as described by Faria 2008) are complementary to capital and become particularly important for manufacturing production at the higher levels of capital accumulation. This hypothesis is consistent with our empirical analysis, namely with the behavior of East Asian "tigers" that beat diminishing returns in their initial stages of capital accumulation (where arguably production of capital-intensive goods was less complex from the point of view of firm organization), but no longer in the most recent stages with these countries joining the capital-rich cone and high levels of capital being used in a production process arguably organized in a more complex manner. Rigorous testing for this hypothesis is an interesting task for future research, which requires both extending the empirical framework we use and collecting data on organizational capital.
We denote by w c and r c the wage and the rental cost of capital in cone c = 1, 2. In the third cone, both the wage and the rental cost of capital depend on K n /L n . They are denoted w 3 (K n /L n ) and r 3 (K n /L n ). Our specification also implies the sensible 10 We have also estimated a model without decreasing marginal product of capital in the capital-rich cone. Most of the results do not change significantly. The major change occurs for the implied compensations. As expected, we find lower implied compensations for the countries in the third cone, and the gap between the implied compensations and the actual ones gets larger. The overall fit of the model (measured by the root MSE for the two aggregates) also gets reduced. We take this as evidence in favor of a decreasing return to capital in the third cone. An estimation of the model setting β = 0.6 indicates a slightly higher increase in the profitability of producing the capital-intensive goods, but we still cannot reject that δ δ = t t k l over the whole period.
result that, when moving from the second cone to the third one, there is no jump in the MPK. In country n with a capital-labor ratio K n /L n , the total value added for the labor-intensive aggregate divided by the total number of workers in manufacturing is given by:
Note that expression (4) is a direct result of our assumption of constant returns to scale in production together with the fact that there is only production of the labor-intensive aggregate in the labor-rich cone, whereas expression (5) also results from the CRS assumption, but divides total manufacturing production between the two aggregates, taking into account the linearity of the production functions for both the labor and the capital-intensive aggregates. Expression (6) simply reflects the fact that there is no production of the labor-intensive aggregate in the third capital-rich cone.
In the same way, for the capital-intensive aggregate, the corresponding expression is:
To ensure the continuity of the value-added functions at τ 1 , we impose w 1 +r 1 τ 1 = w 2 +r 2 τ 1 . For simplicity, we assume w 1 = 0. If production in the third cone production is given by 1 ( , ) ,
i.e., a simple Cobb-Douglas production function augmented by a TFP factor, A, the marginal product of labor in country n is βA(K n /L n ) 1-β and the marginal product of capital is
Using the fact that a country with K n /L n = τ 2 is both in the second cone and in the third cone, we can rewrite the marginal product of labor for a country with .
By considering the possibility that countries lie in different cones, Schott (2003) introduced non-linearities in the value added per worker, with the nonlinearities occurring at the cone frontiers. Here we even have non-linearities within each cone. This does not contradict theory. While simpler, the linear form might be considered, as Fitzgerald and Hallak (2004) put it, a "knife-edge" result derived under very strong assumptions. But once we depart from the textbook case with a number of produced goods equal to the number of factors, there is no reason for linearity to hold at the good or HO-aggregate level.
Notice that this specification introduces restrictions across HO aggregates. Thus, on the one hand, our specification is less restrictive than Schott's (2003) as we allow for TFP and factor quality differences across countries, but, on the other hand, we impose restrictions across aggregates that do not appear in his paper.
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International differences in total factor productivity With Hicks-neutral total factor productivity differences across countries, wages and rental rates of capital differ across countries. Figure 2 shows the effect of such productivity differences: for a relatively productive country n, the production levels of the two aggregates are multiplied by the same factor. This is a pure scale effect as can be clearly seen.
We denote the wage and rental cost of capital in country n when it is located in cone c by, respectively, w cn and r cn , where cone c = 1, 2. We make the assumption that we also have r 2n = αr 1n , with α < 1, for all n: moving from the first cone to the second one leads to the same (proportional) reduction in the marginal product of capital for all countries. Using the above continuity constraints, we get w 2n = (1-α)τ 1 r 1n .
In this setting, the system of equations (4)- (9) can be rewritten to obtain:
2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1
and 1 2 1 ( / , , , , ) 0 if ;
which must hold for each n.
Production path of the labor-intensive good Production path of the capital-intensive good Equations (12)- (14) are obtained from (4)-(6), given our normalization of w 1 = 0 and the assumptions that w 2n = (1-α)τ 1 r 1n and r 2n = αr 1n . Equations (15)- (17) are similarly obtained from (7)- (9) under the same assumptions and using the fact
and ( / ) .
International differences in factor quality We take into account factor quality differences across countries. Let t fn z be the quality of factor f = K,L, in country n at date t. If t n K is the measured quantity of capital and t n L is the measured quantity of labor, then the quantities of capital and labor adjusted for quality are , and .
The way we obtain estimates of these quality factors is detailed in the data section that follows. As we try to be as close as possible to the traditional 2 × 2 model, the relevant quantities of labor and capital are the ones used in the manufacturing sector: in the cone of diversification, the production of each aggregate is dictated by the factor proportion in each sector and the quantity of factors employed in manufacturing.
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Changes in technologies or relative prices As we do not focus on a cross section but instead consider panel data, we must consider the impact of technological progress and of price changes over time. In order to measure these changes, we introduce multiplicative time dummies, denoted t k δ and , t l δ specific to each aggregate but common to all countries. This modelling assumption is simple and in the spirit of the HO model. It is correct if the law of one price holds at the producer level for manufacturing goods produced with similar factor intensities, and if, for each HO aggregate, all countries face the same rate of technological progress. Changes over time of t a δ lead to a scale effect that shifts in the same proportion all the production levels of the a aggregate in any cross section of countries.
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The other scale effect is due to the TFP differences (that appear here through the r 1n 's): it is country-specific and shifts all production levels in the country time series. Taking all of these potential effects into consideration, we finally obtain the empirical model to be estimated:
with 0 t k δ = for the first period in the panel and the f a (·) functions given in Equations (12)-(17).
14 Here, r 1n is the rental cost of capital of country n in the first, labor-rich cone during the first period. But, if country n is in fact in the cone of diversification during the first period, r 1n is the hypothetical rental cost of capital country n would have in the first cone, and r 2n = αr 1n is its actual rental rate.
If our restrictions across aggregates are correct and if technological progress and value changes are the same for the two aggregates, we have:
, . 
We run Non Linear Least Squares on pooled data with observations for all countries at all time periods, in order to estimate the coefficients , , , , t t k l δ δ α β and r 1n .
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Regarding the cone cutoffs τ 1 and τ 2 , as well as the implied aggregation cutoff, q(τ 1, τ 2 ), they are chosen relying on previous works by Debaere : it measures 1) the technological change for the HO aggregate a and 2) the change in the relative price of the goods in the a aggregate (relatively to the consumption goods). 15 The non linear least squares estimation was implemented using the nl command in Stata.
(2003), Schott (2003) and Xu (2003) . Schott (2003) presents evidence that countries in 1990 were lying in two cones of diversification. He estimates a cone cutoff such that all of the OECD countries lie in the capital-rich cone and most of the less developed countries lie in a labor-rich cone. Debaere and Demiroglu (2003) show that, also in 1990, the OECD countries with endowments sufficiently similar lied in the same cone, but the poorer countries were too labor abundant to be in this cone. Building on these works, we choose two cutoffs (τ 1 = 1500 and τ 2 = 15,000) such that the OECD countries were all located in the same cone around 1990
n n K L τ * * ∈ +∞ and most developing countries lie in another cone (with
n n K L τ τ * * ∈ ). Consistent with Xu (2003) , the poorest countries (Bangladesh and Sri Lanka in this paper) are located in a third cone (with
The implied aggregation cutoff is computed to be
Data and construction of the main variables
We use data from the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO 2005a,b) and the Penn World Table version 6.1 (PWT) (Heston, Summers, and Aten 2002) . The UNIDO data set is admittedly not exhaustive in terms of country coverage, but provides the widest time span available for industry-level data, and we find it a useful data source to construct a large panel of 44 developed and developing countries over the 1976-2000 period.
The UNIDO data set at the 3-digit level presents data for 28 sectors, but several countries aggregate data for two or more sectors (like "food products" and "beverages") into a larger one. To appropriately recognize missing data, we follow Koren and Tenreyro (2007) and aggregate sectors so as to obtain a consistent classification across countries. This leaves us with the 19 sectors or industries listed in Table 1 .
To estimate the model, we use 5-year averages for the periods 1976-1980, 1981-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1995, and 1996-2000 . We use the data for a country in a given period when they are available and when the country is reasonably open to international trade (as documented in Sachs and Warner 1995) . The time 16 Our model is close to the one selected by Schott (2003) for the cross section he studies (year 1990) . He ignores the first cone, the one specialized in the labor-intensive aggregate, but we find that there are only two countries in that cone anyway. He assumes that the OECD cone is a cone of diversification, where countries produce both capital-intensive goods and goods with an average capital intensity. We instead group all these goods in a single aggregate of capital-intensive goods.
period is sufficiently long to make reasonable the assumption of capital mobility within and across sectors at the national level.
Labor To measure the quantity of labor in a given industry and at the manufacturing level, we use data from the UNIDO database. These data are corrected for the heterogeneity of human capital with the method proposed by Hall and Jones (1999) and used, for instance, by Demiroglu (2003, 2006) . Data on educational achievement are from Barro and Lee (2000) . Table 2 contains the relevant data.
Capital To compute the stocks of capital at the industry level, we use investment data from the UNIDO at the 3-digit (UNIDO, 2005a) and 4-digit (UNIDO, 2005b) levels. 17 We take investment in current US dollars, and use exchange rates from the PWT to convert these numbers in the current national currency. We compute the implicit national investment deflators as the ratio value of national invest- Capital and labor are measured in quality-equivalent units. Capital is in 1996 US dollars. na, not available. (Table   2 Contiuned) ment in current national currency units (ICUR)/value of national investment in 1996 national constant prices (IKON). With the deflated investments, we then use the perpetual inventory method to compute stocks of capital at the sectorial level. We choose a depreciation rate of 6%. 18 The exact formula is the one employed by Leamer (1984, p. 233 , third proposed method). We compute initial capital stocks assuming a constant geometric growth rate for investment. This way we obtain national stocks of capital in the 1996 national currency units.
We rely on Eaton and Kortum (2001) to derive estimates of the relative prices of quality-equivalent capital in the various countries. They use 1985 data on the international trade of equipment goods 19 to infer their real prices in many developed and developing countries. The ability to extract information on relative prices from trade data is based on the following reasoning: 1) observing country n with big market shares around the world indicates that n is a competitive supplier of capital goods, and 2) observing that country n′ imports a lot relative to home purchases indicates that n′ does not face costly trade barriers to imported capital goods. Eaton and Kortum (2001) find that trade barriers are high for the less developed countries: given the fact that they do not export equipment goods, imports of capital goods should represent a higher fraction of their investment. Among these barriers to trade (also including geographical distance from the major exporters of equipment goods), a low level of skills in poor countries appears to be especially important. This can be interpreted as follows: in relatively backward economies, firms with a low-skilled labor force cannot use the high quality equipment goods produced in the most advanced economies (these goods are not "appropriate"), and, as a result, these goods are not imported; international differences in educational levels therefore result in international quality differences for capital goods. The Eaton-Kortum (2001) estimates for the price of equipment goods for a given country can be understood as the real price of a quality-equivalent unit of equipment good. As prices are normalized so that the US price is equal to one, we find for each country a proxy for the quality-equivalent investment in in the first one. We merge the two matrices. Even after merger, the database contains many holes. In order to compute stocks of capital, we had to make assumptions about these missing values. When there are holes within a sequence and when there are < 6 consecutive years of missing data, we complete the sequence using a linear interpolation. When the beginning (end) of a sequence is missing, we replace the last (first) three missing values with an average of the first (last) three available values. Finally, we keep capital stock estimates only when we have at leastcapital goods (relative to the USA) by adjusting investment by the reported prices for equipment goods. 20 We therefore use the measured price of equipment capital to adjust reported investment downward when investment is costly. 21 To obtain a quality-equivalent stock of capital, we simply divide investment by the price of quality-equivalent capital as estimated by Eaton and Kortum (2001) .
Ideally, we should use price estimates for each year, rather than the EatonKortum's (2001) estimates for 1985. Nevertheless we think that this measure is appropriate for a vast majority of countries as international differences in the real cost of capital should be persistent over time. If international differences in the price of quality-equivalent capital are due to trade barriers like physical distance and the lack of education, these differences should remain pretty stable over time. Indeed, even though the geographical distribution of equipment goods production has slightly changed over time, most countries far away from the main producers of equipment goods have not seen this distance going down over time. And, similarly, the educational gap between the USA and the other countries has not changed much since the beginning of the period we study.
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With these data, we can check that labor in each country n is approximately distributed uniformly in industries with capital-labor ratios in an interval of the .
As we have chosen τ 1 = 1500 and τ 2 = 15,000, labor in country n should be distributed uniformly in industries with capital-labor ratios in 2 1500 2 15,000 ; 0.18 ; 1.82 . 1500 15,000 1500 15,000
More precisely, Eaton and Kortum (2001) conduct a structural estimation of the national prices of (quality-equivalent units of) equipment goods. Their empirical model is a Ricardian model with barriers to trade and a continuum of heterogeneous goods. They estimate the costs parameters that are consistent with their model and with observed bilateral trade data. Their theoretical approach and ours are notably different. But we can still have a situation in which 1) the producer (selling) prices of similar capital goods are almost the same in all countries (as assumed here), and, 2) due to barriers to trade (transportation costs and differences in skills), the effective prices of quality-equivalent units of capital goods do differ across countries. Eaton-Kortum (2001) , we get an estimate of the missing price by using this relationship. We then use z Kn = 1/P kn for all countries. 22 Countries like Korea and Norway are exceptions. For these countries we tend to underestimate real investment for the years after 1985. This is in part compensated by an overestimation for years before 1985. Figure 3 plots the empirical cumulative distribution function (cdf) of labor across industries. We have normalized the industry capital-labor ratios by the same ratio at the country level (in the manufacturing sector), .
assumption is right, each cdf should be on the thick line. Figure 3 indicates that our assumption comes close to what happens in reality. 23 We do find that more than 90% of labor is employed in industries within the required range. There are also some significant industries with capital-labor ratios clearly higher than Unsurprisingly, these are the steel and chemicals industries.
Correcting for the quality differences for the two factors has a significant impact on the relative capital-labor ratios: Table 2 reveals that the correction factor for capital is the most important. As a result, the relative capital-labor ratio for the typical less developed country shrinks. Table 2 also displays the capital/labor ratios (expressed in quality units) for all countries and time periods that are included in our empirical analysis.
For the various periods we study, Table 3 presents the average capital-labor ratios at the industry level in a rich country (the USA) and in a developing one (Malaysia). It appears that the industries which are the most labor-intensive in the USA are also the most labor-intensive in Malaysia (like footwear or furniture). But, with our classification in two HO aggregates and an industry cutoff at q = 3000, we find that, for the USA, just the wearing apparel industry in 1976-1980, is considered to be labor-intensive. On the contrary, for Malaysia in the period 1976-1980, 8 industries (out of 19) belong to the labor-intensive HO aggregate. We also obtain 23 The shape of the cdf might indicate that capital intensities actually follow a gamma distribution. In this paper, we keep the uniform distribution for its simplicity. Table 3 Industry capital-labor ratios in the US and Malaysia.
Sector

1976-1980
the possibly counterintuitive result that the US textile industry was capital-intensive in 1976-1980, while, during the same period, the transport equipment industry in Malaysia was labor-intensive. This result is counterintuitive because, in OECD countries, the transport equipment industry is more capital-intensive than the textile industry. Table 3 just indicates that the transport equipment industry in Malaysia is more labor-intensive than the textile industry in the USA.
Value-added
We compute value-added in 1996 US dollars using the 1996 exchange rates and national consumption deflators implicitly given by the PWT. We prefer not to use PPP-adjusted values: as in the HO model, we assume that all goods produced with the same capital-labor ratio can be sold at the same price on international markets. We conjecture that, for tradables, the observed deviations from absolute PPP at the retail level can be well explained by differences in distribution costs across countries. 24 Thus, we do not assume that the law of one price holds at the retail level, but we assume that it holds at the producer level. Table 4 presents the results of our Non Linear Least Squares estimation using the cutoffs τ 1 = 1500, τ 2 = 15,000, and q = 3000 (all numbers in 1996 US dollars of qualityequivalent capital per effective worker).
Estimation of the model: results
The estimated period dummies t l δ and , , t k t δ ∀ appear to be small (especially for the capital-intensive aggregate) or not statistically significant (especially for the labor-intensive aggregate). This indicates that, over the 1976-2000 period, production patterns across countries are consistent with a model with fixed (relative) prices and technologies. We interpret these findings as a validation of our hypothesis that the cone cutoffs have not moved much between 1976 and 2000.
Our estimates of the rate of return to capital in the labor-rich cone for all countries (r 1n , ∀n) are large and statistically significant. In interpreting these results, one should bear in mind the fact that this rate of return is a counterfactual for most countries in our sample, which are not a part of this cone of diversification even in the earlier periods of our sample.
The results we obtain indicate a large and statistically significant drop in the value of the return to capital when moving from the labor-rich cone to the The Table reports the estimates of the system of equations (18)- (19) with Non Linear Least Squares. These estimates take the HO aggregate cutoff q = 3000 to define the two HO aggregates, and the cone cutoffs τ 1 = 1500 and τ 2 = 15,000 to define the cones.
intermediate cone (with ˆ0.14 α= ). This jump is implied by our simplifying linearity assumption for the first cone: the decrease of the return to capital would be smoother with a Cobb-Douglas specification in the first cone, but even with this alternative specification, we would measure a rapid decrease of the return to capital when countries start accumulating capital.
The labor elasticity of output is found to be of the right order of magnitude ( 0.46 ). β= It may look small, but one should not forget that this elasticity is by assumption common to all countries, including the low-or mid-income ones where the labor share of income in manufacturing is lower than in rich countries.
For the 44 countries included in the regression, Figures 4-9 present the actual development paths (with filled squares and circles) and the predicted development paths (with solid and dashed curves), setting the time dummies at 0, i.e., we report, 
K L for the different dates. Curves show the estimated development paths for the aggregates using Table 4 and Equations 12-13. All numbers in thousands of 1996 US dollars. 
K L for the different dates. Curves show the estimated development paths for the aggregates using Table 4 and Equations 12-13. All numbers in thousands of 1996 US dollars.
and , 1 1 2/ ( / , , , ).
Figures 4-9 therefore allow following the movements across cones of diversification of all countries in our sample. These figures also show the changes in specialization due to the Rybczynski effect. They also display the predicted changes in specialization if countries were to accumulate even more capital, assuming a strong persistence in price and TFP levels.
The figures indicate that, over the whole period, the share of the labor-intensive aggregate in global production has been small. Many countries are specialized in the production of capital-intensive goods. But countries like Bulgaria, Egypt, Indonesia, Malaysia and Sri Lanka produce significant quantities of the labor-intensive aggregate and exhibit specialization patterns that are consistent with our empirical model.
We have presented results with specific cone cutoffs, τ 1 = 1500 and τ 2 = 15,000, and a corresponding HO aggregate cutoff, q = 3000 (all numbers in 1996 US dollars of quality-equivalent capital per effective worker). With lower τ c 's and adjusting accordingly the HO aggregate cutoff, q, the results are not much affected. For 
instance, we cannot reject that t t k l δ δ = over the whole period, 1976-2000. With τ 1 = 2000, τ 2 = 15,000 and q = 4000, we cannot reject this hypothesis over the whole period (except for the period 1993-1997). With the latter cutoffs, we still find very small positive change in the absolute profitability of producing the capital-intensive goods (little changes in t k δ ), while the results might indicate a decrease in the relative price of labor-intensive goods.
One way to check whether our results make sense or not is to compute the annual compensations implied by our estimates: for each country and at any point in time, the implied annual compensation for an effective unit of labor is given by the intercept of the vertical axis and the tangent to the total value-added curve. Data on compensation in the manufacturing sector are collected by the International Labor Organization.
25 Figure 10 presents these actual compensations in 1996 and the compensations implied by our model. The implied compensations appear to be of the right order of magnitude. For the United States and Japan, we have an almost perfect prediction. But for 
25 See the International Labor Organization website, http://laborsta.ilo.org. Annual compensation data are not always available for 1996. When this is not the case, we use other compensation data (monthly, weekly, daily, hourly) or wage data. When used, wage data are multiplied by 1.5. The US compensation data have been multiplied by 1.2 as the available data are for production workers only. For Denmark, we used 1993 compensation data. When the 1996-2000 capital-labor ratio is not available for a country, we use the most recent available number. 
K L for the different dates. Curves show the estimated development paths for the aggregates using Table 4 and Equations 12-13. All numbers in thousands of 1996 US dollars. other countries, the implied compensation is significantly different from the actual one: for many South or Central American countries, we overestimate compensation, while for the European countries, compensation is underestimated. We nevertheless find that the overall results strengthen the case for the "HO aggregates" approach.
The return to capital
The financial rate of return to capital
The HO model with more than one cone predicts that the return to capital is constant in the diversification cone(s), decreasing with the capital-labor ratio in the specialization cones, and decreasing from one cone to the next. In the present work, because the return to capital (or the value of the MPK) is the slope of the total value-added per worker curve and because prices are expressed in 1996 US dollars, we can find an estimate of the return to capital in country n in 1996-2000 implied by our model. It is given by:
where
is the average capital-labor ratio in country n during the period 1996-2000. Note that these are the returns to a unit of quality-equivalent capital in the various countries. The first column in Table 5 shows the resulting estimates for the return to capital in the various countries.
The correlation between ˆn r and the average capital-labor ratio for each value of -0.25. 26 This clearly negative value indicates that higher returns to capital are found in countries with lower capital ratios. As discussed by Caselli and Feyrer (2007) , in a world of capital mobility in which firms and households have access to investment opportunities that yield a common world interest rate R in the various countries (which we denote by FRRK). So, for each country n, we should have an equality between the gross rate of return (of investing in the country's manufacturing sector) and a common gross rate of return R * :
where P kn (t) denotes the price of capital in country n at time t, and d is the depreciation rate. Assuming that the price of capital goods remains constant over time in each country, we would expect the financial rates of return to capital to be equalized in the following way:
This relationship expresses the fact that in the real world, one should expect that the return to capital (or the value of the MPK) corrected by the real price of capital goods is similar across countries.
The second column in Table 6 reports our estimates of the financial rates of return to capital for the year 1996. These are generally much lower and less disperse than the original ˆn r 's. This evidence can be taken as part of an explanation for the Lucas (1990) paradox. Indeed, there does not seem much to be gained from a systematic reallocation of capital from rich to poor countries.
These findings bear some similarity with those of Caselli and Feyrer (2007) . With a different estimation method, they also find that the physical MPK is much higher on average in poor countries. Relying on data from the PWT, they argue that this is compensated by a relatively high cost of investment goods in these countries. Contrary to our reasoning, they argue that this high relative cost of capital goods in poor countries is due to a low price of consumption goods in those countries, while capital goods sell at roughly the same price in all countries. As noticed by Caselli and Feyrer, this may be a consequence of the BalassaSamuelson hypothesis: the productivity gap between poor and rich countries is larger for tradables (including capital goods) than for non-tradables (including consumption goods).
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In this paper, we also find that the returns to capital tend to be higher in poor countries and that these differences are compensated by a high relative cost of capital goods in poor countries. But, on the last point, our reasoning is the opposite of the one by Caselli and Feyrer (2007) . As we focus on the manufacturing sector, the produced goods are generally tradable and therefore the law of one price should be approximately valid for these goods. On the contrary, we use the results in Eaton-Kortum (2001) who find that a unit of quality-equivalent capital is more expensive in poor countries. We thus find in poor countries a high relative price of capital goods, but this is due to their high absolute prices.
Beating the curse of diminishing returns
Neoclassical growth theory does not predict that, in autarky, capital accumulation should fundamentally alter the structure of the economy. In that setting, an increase in the capital-labor ratio leads to a reduction in the relative cost of capital and industries substitute capital for labor accordingly. With more capitalintensive techniques, the marginal product of capital goes down and growth rates of autarky economies are bound to converge. Ventura (1997) proposes a mechanism through which international trade favors capital accumulation, structural change and growth. A small open economy that accumulates capital moves its resources away from the labor-intensive industries to the capital-intensive industries. This is the Rybczynski effect. Note that this is only possible as long as the country is not fully specialized in the capital-intensive goods. As long as the world capital-labor ratio does not change, which is likely the effect of a small open economy increasing its capital-intensive production, the relative price of the capital-intensive goods and the value of the marginal product of capital remain stable sustaining the incentives to produce capital-intensive goods. By trading with the rest of the world, the small growing economy "beats the curse of diminishing returns." 29 Ventura (1997) argues that this phenomenon is part of the explanation for the economic "miracle" in East Asia. Our results support this analysis, but they allow us to be broaden it somewhat. In his model, Ventura (1997) assumes that all countries are in the same cone, necessarily a cone of diversification. Partly contradicting this hypothesis, we have found that most countries instead move not only within a cone, but also across cones-the East Asian countries, in particular, remained in the cone of diversification only during the first phase of their miracle. Transposing Ventura's (1997) reasoning to our model where two HO aggregates are in place of the two goods, this would be the reason why the MPK was constant over time for the East Asian countries in the first phase of their miracle.
Nevertheless, and perhaps most significantly and complementing Ventura's (1997) explanation especially for countries (including the East Asian miracles in the last phase of their growth miracle) who move to more capital-intensive cones, our results also indicate that the return to capital has not decreased over time for most countries at any given capital-labor ratio. This stability of MPK happened even though most countries accumulated capital, and intensified their use of capital in production. Hsieh (1999) reports data on the rate of return to capital in Korea and Singapore that lend support to our argument. For Korea, while the rate of return to capital dropped from 1966 to 1975, the rate of return has been rather constant since 1976. In Singapore, the rate of return to capital has been relatively constant since 1962. These pieces of evidence are together consistent with Young's (1995) view that factor accumulation was the key engine in the East Asian miracles -arguably, we now add, because they were able to somehow beat the curse of diminishing returns.
To explain our MPK stability result, we hypothesize, but leave the microeconomic testing for further research, that returns to capital may have been sustained by technological progress in the capital-intensive industries, which complemented an initial positive effect of trade on growth. Regardless of the economic mechanisms underlying this result, our work puts forward the empirical observation that the value of the MPK has been sustained over time for most countries, which is not only in agreement with Ventura (1997) s explanation for the East Asian miracles, but could also help explaining other recent experiences with strong effective capital deepening, such as those of Japan or the UK.
29 Note that this does not mean that it is international trade that promotes capital accumulation per se: it is just that international trade allows factor price stability for the small open economy, which has an indirect effect on incentives to sustain capital accumulation processes.
Using panel data, we estimate a simple Heckscher-Ohlin (HO) model with multiple cones, intra-industry specialization, and TFP differences across countries. In addition, to make factor quantities comparable across countries, we measure factors in effective quality-equivalent units. With the time dimension, we can improve on Schott (2003) who focused on a single cross section: the country time series allow us to estimate TFP differences and to compare the actual development paths to the ones predicted by theory.
More fundamentally, with our integrated approach, we emphasize not only the relationship between factor endowments and specialization, but also the role played by factor returns. Indeed, with the estimated parameters, we can obtain both the compensations for effective units of labor and the rental rates for effective units of capital implied by the model. We then use these estimates to test for the internal consistency of the approach (there is no FPE) and to study the incentives to re-allocate or accumulate capital.
We confirm the traditional Heckscher-Ohlin prediction that if factor endowments are sufficiently far away, regions may produce sufficiently different goods so that they are not directly competing. One should, however, consider the recent contributions of Schott (2008) and Hallak and Schott (2009) , who emphasize the importance of differences in the quality of goods, as important qualifiers to any policy implications that one could wish to draw from our results.
In the various cross sections, we find that poor countries have higher rental rates of capital and, accordingly, specialize in the production of labor-intensive goods. Although one could expect these higher returns to attract investment from rich countries, we show that the financial rates of return to capital investment are generally not higher in the less developed countries. The reason for this is that, as shown by Eaton and Kortum (2001) , the price of effective capital is higher in poor countries. This could explain why we do not observe larger investments from rich into poor countries.
Analyzing the development paths, we find that countries experience the structural change predicted by theory. Moreover, decomposing the changes over time in the countries' capital-labor ratios in within-industry changes and between-industry changes, we show that, for most countries (including the East Asian growth miracles), this process of structural change is mainly a change of specialization within industries. Therefore, structural transformation has been less disruptive than it would have been with the more radical changes of specialization across industries. In addition, despite capital accumulation by most countries, we find no decrease in the return to capital (or in the value of the MPK) at any given capital-labor ratio. This must have stimulated growth through capital accumulation.
